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Abstract: An increasing number of regions in the United Kingdom (UK) are experiencing 
water shortages. The universal installation of household water meters has been identified 
as one way to reduce demand on limited supplies. The general consensus among policy-
makers and water practitioners is that meters ‘work’ by providing a financial incentive to 
residents to use less water. Recent studies however, suggest that mechanisms that drive 
changes in water-user behaviours are more complex and context-dependent. Using an 
approach developed in the field of program evaluation, this paper examines policy-maker 
and water practitioner understandings of how a current universal metering program in 
the south east of the UK ‘works’. These understandings are then compared to how water 
meters are managed and accepted at a household level. The findings demonstrate how 
‘Realistic Evaluation’ (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) can be used to gain a deeper 
understanding of how technological interventions ‘work’ in complex social systems.   
Key words : realistic evaluation; water meters; universal water metering; United 
Kingdom; rational choice model; environmental education. 
Introduction  
In spite of its reputation as a country with abundant rainfall, an increasing number of regions in the 
United Kingdom (UK) are struggling to make water ends meet (Butler & Memom, 2006; DEFRA, 
2008; OFWAT, 2006). At a glance the balance sheet appears unyielding on both sides. On the one 
hand, demand pressure in the UK is set to increase in the next 20 years, driven primarily by population 
growth, new housing development and reducing household size (Sim, McDonald, Parsons, & Rees, 
2005, p. ii). While on the other, the provision of extra water resources through conventional means 
(the building of new reservoirs, water transfers, groundwater abstraction etc) is becoming increasingly 
difficult due to escalating economic, social and environmental costs (DEFRA, 2008; FDWS, , 2005). 
Faced with these challenges, demand management has emerged as the favoured strategy for managing 
the UK‟s water needs (UKWIR/ EA, 1997). Demand management seeks to ease pressure on mains 
water supplies through the implementation of policies which combine economic, technological and 
behavioural factors to encourage efficient and conservative water use (Kallis & Coccossis, 1999). 
With the potential to work on all three of these fronts, the Environment Agency has identified water 
meters as the cornerstone of future water resources management in the UK; setting meter penetration 
targets of between 60-90% of households by 2030 (Sim, McDonald, Parsons, & Rees, 2005). 
A water meter is a measuring device that is typically fitted to external supply piping to enable water 
companies to charge customers for the amount of water they use. It is generally accepted that meters 
„work‟ in two ways: one is to reduce the amount of water lost through leakage; the other is to reduce 
the amount of water customers use (Gadbury et al., 1993). This paper focuses on the latter mechanism. 
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The general consensus among regulators, Government and water companies is that meters „work‟ by 
instigating a chain of reasoning whereby customers will endeavour to use less water if they are paying 
for it on a measured basis (DEFRA, 2008; Environment Agency, 2007; FDWS, , 2005; Sim, 
McDonald, Parsons, & Rees, 2005). For instance, in a recent review of water efficiency measures to 
be implemented into existing homes in the UK, the Environmental Agency (2007) writes that water 
meters have „the potential to generate significant reductions in the demand for water, by providing a 
price signal against which to compare consumption‟.  
Rational choice model 
The logic underpinning this consensus follows an economically-based rational choice model, whereby 
people are presumed to assess the choices before them in terms of costs and benefits and then select 
the choice that maximises their net monetary benefits (Australian Government, 2007). The rational 
choice model can be deconstructed into three key assumptions about social action (Scott, 2000; Zey, 
1992):  
1. That the choice is rational (in the case of water meters, this choice is assumed to be 
„economically‟ rational); 
2. That the individual is the appropriate unit of analysis in social action; and, 
3. That choices are made in the pursuit of individual self-interest (Jackson, 2005).  
Criticisms of the economically-based rational choice model as the primary determinant of water use 
decisions made by metered customers can be categorised as responses to one or more of the above 
assumptions. For example, Strang (2004) describes a highly complex relationship between citizens and 
water, in which diverse cultural meanings and values „exert a powerful influence over every decision 
involved in water use […] and that they are difficult to alter‟. While Sharp (2006) notes that the 
policy-makers‟ process of demand management presented as a matter of choice between different 
instruments which influence customers decisions ignores „the important and complex relationships 
between the consumers and producers of water‟. Both perspectives question the assumption that the 
individual is the appropriate unit of analysis and that choices are made in the pursuit of individual self-
interest; Strang (2004) places the water user in relation to „values‟ held by society, whereas Sharp 
highlights the water user‟s relationship with water producers. Similarly, Strang‟s (2004) emphasis on 
the powerful influence of cultural meanings and values calls into question the assumption that choices 
relating to water use are based on economic rationalism.  
Education campaigns 
Change initiatives underpinned by rational choice theory are typically operationalised through the 
provision of information communicated to customers via education campaigns. These campaigns work 
under the assumption that while the potential for economic gains provides the impetus for altered 
patterns of behaviour, education campaigns provide users with strategies for achieving those gains. 
For example in the context of metering, the House of Lords (2006) holds the view that, „…if metering 
is to make a long term difference, it must be accompanied by a programme of awareness raising about 
the importance of water efficiency‟. Abundant research however, shows that attempts to increase 
knowledge, perceptions, or attitudes through environmental education or media campaigns in order to 
change behaviour are often ineffective (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002).  
Historical metering trials  
Water consumption data from historical metering trials is often called on as evidence to support 
rational choice model understandings of how meters „work‟. Herrington (2005) reviewed four large-
area, compulsory metering trials in the UK from 1970 to 1996 which showed average demand 
reductions in the 10%-15% range (Herrington, 2005); a figure that is often quoted by proponents of 
water metering. Herrington (2005) also reviewed results from the National Metering Trials (NMTs) 
(1988-92) which confirmed this range. Close examination of the findings from these trials, however, 
reveals limitations in both the accuracy of the results and their transferability to other metered areas. In 
two of the four reviewed reports (Isle of Wright and Malvern/Mansfield), Herrington (2005) cites the 
possible influence of social and historical context on post-metering water consumption, cautioning the 
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transfer of the reported ranges to the present day „without other supporting evidence‟. The method of 
derivation used for the third of the four trials (Anglian Water) was unable to be located, while the true 
metering impact effect for the fourth trial (Fylde) was revised up to take into account the increase in 
water consumption recorded at unmeasured properties adjacent to the test area during the trials 
(Herrington, 2005). With respect to the NMTs, a report published a year after the trials cited „a need to 
improve its knowledge about the confidence that could be placed in National Metering Trials data…‟ 
(WRc, 1995). This need was subsequently translated into two recommendations for further review and 
re-working of the results from the trials. However at the time of writing his own review, Herrington 
(2005) had received no response from the relevant water companies as to whether either of these 
recommendations had been acted upon. 
Where to from here? 
The aim of the above discussions is not to argue against the widespread installation of household water 
meters in the UK. Rather, it is to demonstrate two important points. First, as the historical metering 
trials demonstrate, it is not a straightforward exercise to estimate the precise impact of metering on 
water demand; „not least because, by definition, those households switching to metered charging have 
not been metered in the period immediately preceding their switch‟ (Sharp, 2006). Second, the 
effectiveness of water metering depends on the social contexts into which they are implemented. Both 
points highlight the need to treat historical „average reduction in demand‟ estimates with caution. 
While the second point underscores the need for policy-makers to seek an understanding of prevailing 
social conditions which may influence how meters are accepted and managed at a household level.  
It follows that responses to widespread water metering in the UK are likely to vary. As Jeffrey and 
Geary (2005) write „different groups of water users clearly respond to economic instruments in 
different ways at different times‟. Thus the task of research is to uncover how water meters „work‟ for 
whom, and in which circumstances (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). In this paper we use an approach 
developed in the field of program evaluation to examine the response to an on-going universal 
metering program in the south east of the UK. The main contribution of this paper is a demonstration 
of how the „Realistic Evaluation‟ (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) approach can be used to explain causal 
connections between contextual conditions and behavioural outcomes.  
Methodology  
Theory 
Realistic Evaluation (RE) (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) is a methodological approach designed to evaluate 
social programs; where social programs are defined as „merely a special case of social change… 
[consisting of]… a spiral of new ideas and transforming conditions‟ (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). RE 
seeks to answer the question „what is it about a program that „works‟ for whom and in which 
circumstances?‟. This line of enquiry is based on the principle of generative causation. That is, 
outcomes (e.g. reductions in domestic water use) are generated as a result of mechanisms being fired 
in particular contexts (Figure 1). In other words, programs are said to „work‟ (have successful 
„outcomes‟) only in so far as they introduce the appropriate ideas and opportunities („mechanisms‟) to 
groups in the appropriate social and cultural conditions (‟contexts‟) (Pawson et al. 1997). Social 
programs are thus based on ideas about how interventions „work‟. Ideas have their time and place. It is 
this conjunction that RE aims to capture with the notion of a context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) 
configuration (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). 
 
Figure 1: Generative Causation 
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In this paper, we liken water metering to a social program. We argue that metering shares a 
characteristic similar with all social programs, that being; that, apart from facilitating the detection of 
leaks, there is nothing about water metering which intrinsically reduces the amount of water that 
customers use. Rather, meters „work‟ (or don‟t „work‟) by „instigating a chain of reasoning and 
reaction‟ (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). As discussed in the previous section, the ways in which policy 
instruments, such as water meters, „work‟ is a contested issue. Below we begin by articulating policy-
maker and practitioner understandings of how an on-going universal metering program in the south 
east of the UK program is designed to „work‟ and then compare these understandings to how water 
meters are managed and accepted at a household level. 
To this end, data collection for this study was driven by the following two research questions: 
1. What mechanisms for change are triggered by the implementation of water meters and how do 
they counteract existing water usage patterns? And, 
2. What social and cultural conditions are necessary for these change mechanisms to operate? 
Methods 
This study focused on a universal metering program implemented by a company in the south east of 
the UK (Company X). Data collection was undertaken during a three-week period in July 2008. 
Methods included: in-depth interviews, a survey, document analyses and observational field notes.  
In-depth interviews were conducted with the following stakeholders:  
 The metering and water efficiency program coordinator at a Company X (n=1); 
 Employees at Company X responsible for the installation and management of water meters 
(n=2); and, 
 Residents living in the area serviced by Company X (n=21). 
A survey (n=18) was undertaken in a town where, at the time of the study, Company X had recently 
completed installing household water meters. Documents, including Company X business reports and 
website, water saving educational material provided to customers by Company X, and relevant 
government publications were also analysed.  
Findings were validated against a qualitative study of domestic water metering conducted in 2007 by 
researchers from the University of Bradford (Knamiller & Sharp, 2007). 
Findings 
Policy-maker understandings of how universal water metering ‘works’ 
The first step in this study was to uncover policy-maker understandings of how universal metering 
programs „work‟. These were derived from the Company X website and business reports, as well as 
relevant government publications. Policy-maker understandings from these sources were distilled into 
over-arching program theories (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), or conjectures, describing how universal 
metering programs „work‟. In Table 1 we articulate these conjectures in realistic terms, that is, in 
terms of context-mechanism-outcome configurations.  
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Table 1: Policy-maker understandings of how universal metering ‘works’ 
Context + Mechanism = Outcome 
One of the driest parts of the 
country (C1) with limited natural 
resources of water to draw upon 
(C2). 
Climate change is resulting in 
warmer weather which is further 
reducing water supplies (C3).  
Residents currently use „a lot of 
water‟ which can be easily reduced 
by 10-15% without affecting 
lifestyle (C4). 
 Water meters (M1) provide an 
incentive to customers to save 
money (M2) by using less water 
(M3) and repairing any leaks on 
their apparatus (M4). 
Unmetered customers do not 
have the same clear incentive.  
M1 -M4 are facilitated by 
educational campaign material 
(M5) which include various 
water saving/ efficiency 
strategies (M5A) and 
informat ion relat ing to C1, C2, 
C3 and C4 (M5B). 
 When mechanisms M1-
M5  are introduced into 
contexts C1-C4, 
customers will reduce 
their water use by 10-15% 
on average, compared to 
un-metered customers 
(O1).  
These reductions in 
household water use will 
secure supplies for the 
next ten years and beyond 
(O2). 
A key point to note here is how the RE approach facilitates a contextual understanding of social 
programs. As discussed in the previous sections, the effectiveness of water metering programs is 
typically attributed to rational choice theory. In realist terms, rational choice theory is represented by 
mechanisms M1-M4 which are assumed to lead to outcomes O1-O2, regardless of context. The above 
analysis thus constitutes a first step towards investigating the influence of social and historical context, 
as alluded to by Herrington (2005) in his review of historical metering trials in the UK.  
Practitioner understandings of how universal water metering ‘works’  
In Table 2 we complement these over-arching program theories with one example of a practitioner 
understanding of how universal water metering „works‟. The realist theory presented below was 
derived from in-depth interviews with employees at Company X.  
Table 2: Practitioner understanding of how universal metering ‘works’ 
Context + Mechanism = Outcome 
C1-C4 + 
Unmetered customers 
are “wasteful” with 
water (C5). 
 M1-M5A, M5B + 
Educational material headlined with 
messages such as: “Save it! Don’t 
take water for granted”, and “Are 
you wasting money?” (M5Ai). 
 Introducing mechanism 
M5Ai into context C5 will 
lead to outcomes O1 and 
O2.  
Mechanism M1 led 
practitioners at Company X 
to believe that “we are not 
very popular here in water 
metering” (O3). 
In Table 2, we see how program theories can change when enacted by practitioners. The key 
difference illustrated above is the contextual assumption that unmetered customers are “wasteful” with 
water. Subsequently, it is possible, in fact even probable, that this position played a role in the design 
of educational materials which urge customers to waste less water and/or money. The assumption that 
unmetered customers waste water immediately places the unmetered customer‟s present behaviour at 
fault, as compared to Company X who is tasked with correcting this fault. With this relationship 
between the „consumers and producers of water‟ (Sharp, 2006), it is unsurprising that practitioners at 
Company X believed that they were generally not popular with newly metered customers.  
Sochacka et al., A Realistic Evaluation of Universal Water Metering in the United Kingdom’s South 
East 
Proceedings of the Environmental Research Event 2009, Noosa, QLD 6 
Customer/ household level understandings of how meters ‘work’  
In Table 3 we present a realist theory of how meters are accepted and managed at a household level. 
This theory emerged from interviews with residents living in the area serviced by Company X and was 
triangulated against survey results and a qualitative study undertaken by Knamiller et al. (2007). 
Contrasting, or counter-, understandings to previously identified contexts, mechanisms and outcomes 
are denoted with „‟‟, e.g. C1‟ would indicate that customers do not believe that they are living in one 
of the driest parts of the country.  
Table 3: Customer understandings of how universal metering ‘works’ 
Context + Mechanism = Outcome 
Customers feel they 
do not use (C4’) or 
waste much water 
(C5’). 
“Others” [customers] 
waste water (C5’A). 







are for “others” 
who waste water 
(M5Ai’).  
 Water meters (M1) may reduce or increase 
water bills. This however, is largely out of 
the customer‟s control as they are already 
not using much water (C4’). Thus counter 
mechanisms M2’, M3’, M4’ lead to 
limited changes to water consumption 
(O1’).  
Mechanism M5Ai is ineffective when 
introduced into contexts C4’, C5’ and 
C5’A which may also lead to O1’.  
Mechanism M5Ai may be further 
comprised if introduced into context C6, 
again leading to O1’. 
Table 3 illustrates how the RE approach can be used to diagnose areas for improvement in the 
implementation of social programs. Of particular interest above is the general belief held by customers 
that they do not waste water, in fact, that many currently use only the bare minimum. This belief 
coexists with the assumption that “others” waste water and may serve to explain why there are few 
vocal objections to educational materials that target wastage; these materials would, after all, be 
informative for the many customers (the “others”) who do waste water. Moreover, one could speculate 
that even if some customers were to concede that they could reduce their water consumption, a portion 
of these customers may decide not to do so, on the basis that Company X wastes far more water 
through leakage.  
Conclusion 
The above analysis demonstrates first, that the success of social programs depends on the contexts into 
which they are implemented, and second, the importance of exploring differing program 
understandings held by policy-makers, practitioners and program targets, in our case, customers of 
Company X. In these ways, realistic evaluation provides a means to gain a deeper understanding of 
how technological interventions „work‟ in complex social systems. 
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